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1 INTRODUCTION
The European Union is a major political and economic force on the European continent drawing
in various European states to its orbit. The EU enlargement process, which resulted in the Union
doubling its size in the last six years, is a testimony to the increasing attractiveness of the EU,
especially for the less developed countries on the continent. Even though all European states
can apply for membership, it must be noted that accession to the EU has become more di¢ cult
with every enlargement round. An applicant rst needs to be declared as an o¢ cial candidate,
which requires that the country satises the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria. Then,
it has to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, the whole body of the EU rules and
regulations in force, which means, it has to go through a politically and economically painful
and long process of reforms to gain membership status. Naturally, as the European integration
deepens, the acquis entails more, and the road to membership becomes more rocky. Moreover,
through the years, the whole process became more and more detailed and strictly scrutinized by
di¤erent institutions of the EU. Some of the decisions that were taken in the previous rounds are
now regarded as miscalculations and become important lessons for the EU, such as not provisionally
closing a chapter unless the candidate is e¤ectively enforcing the legislation. In other words, each
enlargement for the EU is a learning experience and as the EU advances on the learning curve, new
candidates are subject to tougher entry criteria.
In this paper we provide a detailed insight into this learning process by studying the EU accession
negotiations and their informational role, from a rational institutionalist perspective. We model
the accession negotiations as a Bayesian game and demonstrate how this process helps the EU
in gathering information about a candidate country. We also study the e¤ects of various design
changes on the information carrying capacity of the negotiations to better understand why the
design of the negotiations evolved in the way it did.
The dynamics and the justications of enlargement from the perspectives of both the applicant
countries and the Union have been studied widely in the political science and economics literature.
Schimmelfennig (2001), for example, argues that enlargement is a result of jointly shared values
and norms. In his view, the European Union is a liberal international community and admits all
countries that share its collective identity and adhere to its constitutive norms. In other words,
enlarging the European Union is desirable in order to expand the European family of states and to
create a collective identity at the European level. Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003), on the other
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hand, support a more material interests based approach and argue that the member statesleaders
support enlargement because it is economically and geopolitically benecial to them in the long run.
Similarly applicants embark on a laborious accession process because membership entails economic
and political benets. Having said that, Moravcsik and Vachudova also point out that, once in,
we should expect the new members to deploy their voting and veto power to transfer resources to
themselves. The fact that each new member automatically becomes a veto player creates concerns
that enlargement will cause gridlock in EU institutions and change the course of EU integration.
Moravcsik and Vachudova argue that this kind of pessimism is exaggerated and that the real issue
is not the number of members per se but whether they have diverging interests. In line with this
argument, Plumper et al. (2005) argue that the EU uses accession negotiations to gain information
about policy preferences of relevant parties in candidate countries. The EU carefully observes
the legislative deliberations triggered by the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the
candidate country, and based on these observations decides whether the candidate has diverging
political preferences which, once she gets in, can cause disturbances in the EU decision making
processes. They argue that the acquis communautaire reforms imposed upon applicants allow EU
member states to identify countries that are likely to produce high political costs once accepted
as new members....the closure of chapters signals that an applicant country will most likely not
impede the smooth operation of future decision-making processes within the EU. This is why the
Union applies an ever-increasing set of membership conditionality to applicant states at each round
of enlargement. With every new round of negotiations, the EU has toughened up its criteria so as
to get a clear signal about the compatibility of candidate countries. Plumper et al.s conclusions
are in line with the rational institutionalist approach which argues that states design international
institutions to further their own goals, that design di¤erences are not random, and that membership
conditionality increases with uncertainty about the preferences of candidates (Koremenos et al.,
2001). Sound though it may be, the argument that the accession negotiations help the Union clear
the uncertainty about the candidate brings forth another question, the question of how exactly
they do so. So far, the literature lacks a detailed explanation of the information transmission
mechanisms embedded in the negotiations. Our contribution is demonstrating how exactly the
signaling and learning takes place during the negotiations, and how the design can be improved
upon. We model the negotiations as a Bayesian game and demonstrate how exactly the design in
place helps the Union in gathering information about the candidate country. Our model also enables
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us to compare alternative negotiation designs in terms of their ability to alleviate informational
problems. We compare the resulting equilibrium payo¤s under di¤erent negotiation designs to see
whether there is any ground for a player to prefer a particular design over others. Based on our
results, we conclude that whether a negotiation design is optimal or not in terms of its capacity to
reveal information to the EU depends on what kind of a belief the EU has about the candidate at
the begining of the negotiations.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed insight into the EU accession negotiations
and their informational role, from a rational institutionalist perspective with special emphasis on
the Turkish accession negotiations, a particularly di¢ cult case for the Union. In Section 2, a
brief discussion of accession negotiations will be conducted to help us in constructing our game
setup. In Section 3, we model the accession negotiations as a Bayesian game, and analyze three
di¤erent designs, one of them being the design currently in use. The games are compared in terms
of their equilibrium outcomes and payo¤s for the players, to see whether there is any ground for
a player to prefer a particular game over the other. As a result of this comparison, one better
understands why the design of the negotiations evolved in the way it did. Our model builds on
Plumper et al.s argument that the EU observes the closure of chapters to gain information about
the candidate. Our results support Koremenos et al.s rational institution design conjecture that
restrictive membership increases with uncertainty about the preferences of candidates.
2 ACCESSION TO THE EU
There are explicit conditions for joining the EU that reect the values and interests of the member
states. These conditions have been set out in the Treaties, Council statements, and legal agreements
between the EU and candidates (Smith, 2003). The 1993 Copenhagen criteria adopted by the
European Council as a framework for enlargement, specify the conditions that an applicant country
has to fulll in order for accession negotiations to begin. The process of negotiations is in turn
determined by the ability of the candidate country to adopt 85,000 page acquis communautaire.
The acquis is organized into chapters which, in turn, are organized among themselves according to
their level of importance, with the chapters relating to the single market and four freedoms coming
rst. However, the chapters to be negotiated does not have to follow a specic order. The rst phase
of negotiations is the screening phase, an analytical examination of the acquis. The second phase
is the opening of chapters for which there are no expected problems. In other words, candidates
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start with the chapters that require less work from them, i.e. the easy chapters, and move on to
the di¢ cult ones. The EU can also add further requirements depending on the characteristics of
the candidate. For example, the negotiation framework for Turkey includes conditions on good
neighborly relations and continuous e¤orts towards a comprehensive settlement for the Cyprus
problem, as well as an indirect recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (Turkish Foreign Ministry,
2007). The EUs stance might change with every new negotiation, from one candidate to the
other. For example, with the 2004 enlargement, closing of chapters was possible once the candidate
passed the legislation harmonizing its laws to the EU, and the EU did not expect to see the
implementation of the legislation. In the case of Turkey and Croatia, for all such chapters, proof
of implementation of legislation is necessary for their provisional closure. Similarly, in the previous
rounds of negotiations, the acquis was presented to the candidates in the form of 31 chapters,
however, with the Turkish and the Croatian cases, the chapters to be negotiated rose to 35. This,
however, is understandable, as the acquis became more complex some chapters were divided into
two.
In the process of negotiations, intergovernmental conferences between the EU and the candi-
date are held in addition to the regular meetings between the chief negotiator from the candidate
and the Permanent Representatives of EU members (COREPER). During the screening process,
the Commission conducts an examination of all relevant chaptersand concludes every chapters
screening with a screening report. The screening report, then has to be adopted by the Council
unanimously as the common negotiating document. The Commission handles the technical aspects
and prepares the Draft Common Position(DCP), submits it to the Council, which if unanimously
approved, becomes the Common Position(CP) presented to the candidate. The Council could
adopt the Common Position in its Ad hoc Enlargement group if there is unanimity on the DCP
(DCP becomes CP). If a member state does not agree with the DCP, then the Commission and
the Council negotiate over the DCP and nd an acceptable CP, either way, the Council reaches
a Common Position which is then turned over to the candidate. The candidate needs to submit
position paperson the Commissions DCP, if the candidate agrees to the CP, the agreement would
be decided as an Article of Accession Treaty. If she does not agree, then the Commission and the
Council work on the CP and then present it to the candidate again. The process could be reiterated
with back and forth positions until the candidate agrees and the Council adopts unanimously. As
a result of this iteration, the chapter is discussed and provisionally closed at the IGC level-all 27
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EU members and the candidate, and become an Article of the Accession Treaty. When all chapters
are negotiated and provisionally closed, the Drafting committee of 27 member statesexperts, the
candidate, the Council secretariat and the Commission draw up the Accession Treaty, its annexes
and protocols. Until the Accession Treaty is signed, the Commission can always reopen the provi-
sionally closed chapters if the candidate fails to enforce the required legislation. This is the process
through which the EU monitors the internal developments in the candidate country, and through
which the linkages between the negotiations and domestic structures are maintained.
Although it sounds as if the EU just tells the candidate what needs to be done and the candidate
does it, the process is not exactly so, for otherwise there would be no need to talk about a negotiation
process. At the IGC level, there is not much discussion, however, in between the regular meetings
there is usually signicant articulation. The candidate country or the Commission can always ask
for measures to ease the pain of transformation. Reform is always a costly project, both nancially
and politically, and especially so when the impulse comes from outside. In many cases governments
of candidate countries nd themselves faced with di¢ cult trade-o¤s between short term and long
term interests. They are to pay immediate costs of transformation in return for possible membership
benets which are to come at the end of a long and di¢ cult journey. Candidates or the EU member
states might demand long transitional periods, derogations, specic arrangements, and permanent
safeguard clauses in certain policy areas to ease the pain of harmonization.
The Council may decide to help out the candidate by allowing the use of such measures. The
Council can also use its authority to decide on what is su¢ cient, either to help out a candidate, or
in some cases to make life more di¢ cult for the candidate. In the case of the Greek membership
negotiations, for example, we see a Council agreeing to welcome Greece into the Union in spite of the
Commission opinion that Greece was far from fullling the necessary conditions in several chapters
(Smith, 2003). Similarly, in 2003, the Council decided for the membership of the Republic of
Cyprus, although Gunter Verheugen, the then Commissioner for Enlargement, publicly announced
that Cyprus could not fulll the acquis in the common foreign and security policy (Nugent, 2000).
This is because the technical and political aspects of the negotiations are intertwined. Even though
the negotiations process seems to be a technical issue, it actually is also highly political. The
technical aspects are handled by the Commission and the political concerns come to the forefront
in the Council where member state preferences play an important role. An illustration of its
political character is provided by the December 2006 Council decision to suspend negotiations with
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Turkey on eight chapters until Turkey agrees to open up her ports to the Republic of Cyprus. This
decision may be understandable for those chapters about trade, but interestingly one of those eight
chapters is agriculture (BBCTurkish, 2006). More importantly, the Council tacitly agreed to a
closure criteria for every chapter: accordingly, every chapters provisional closure will be subject to
the Turkish moves on the Cyprus issue, even if Turkey fullls all the technical aspects and adopts
the acquis in its entirety in all the chapters. Thus, this demonstrates that certain political criteria
could enter the negotiations process as a benchmarking criteria even when the screening process is
completed with a positive report, and the candidate is able to fully adopt the acquis.
These examples clearly show that the decision to open and provisionally close chapters in the
accession talks go beyond the candidates ability to adopt the acquis. The Council, when deciding
on what constitutes su¢ cient fulllment, weighs possible costs to existing members of letting in a
candidate country at her present status against the benets of having that country as a member.
What is important is that these costs and benets are all subjectively assessed by each member
state in a decision environment infested with informational imperfections. This subjectivity is
most clear in the Turkish membership case. For member states like Austria and Germany, the
possible costs to the EU of a future Turkish accession is very high, and so they are in favor of
making chapter openings and closures as di¢ cult as possible. On the other hand, EU member
states such as Britain and Spain, who believe that the benets of Turkish membership outweigh
its costs, are more supportive in their attitudes. Interestingly, both sides arguments are based
on probabilistic assessments of future trends and events. Austria probably believes that Turkey
will not be able to catch up with the other EU members in terms of economic development, and
also that her population will continue to grow fast which will then disturb the labor markets in
the EU (Strasser, 2008). It is also probable that many Austrian politicians do not see Turkey as
European, and thus fear that her inclusion will be detrimental to the deepening of integration.
Britain on the other hand, probably sees a future Turkey, who, after successfully completing her
transformation, becomes the stronghold of democracy and stability on the Middle Eastern border of
the EU. According to the former British Foreign Minister Jack Straw, it is going to be a long road
ahead for bringing Turkey into the EU, but it is a prize worth striving for(Beunderman, 2005).
Moreover, the possibility that integration may slow down when Turkey joins, may even register as
a benet on the British side. In short, the Councils decision is shaped through the reconciliation
of these di¤erent and most often conicting calculations. Thus, one can always argue that how
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much transformation a candidate is to go through depends, among other things, on what kind of
support she has in the Council. And support in the Council depends on the beliefs the member
countries carry about the candidate. This argument can be formalized in a Bayesian negotiation
game setting between the EU and a candidate country where the EU members are divided among
themselves about whether the candidate will be able to handle the necessary transformations or
not, and whether bringing the candidate into the EU is a prize worth striving for.
3 THE MODEL
We have two players, the EU and the candidate country (hereafter referred to as the Candidate),
negotiating over a nite set of chapters. For simplicity we will consider a game with two chapters.
Each chapter consists of certain adaptation measures to be taken by the Candidate to harmonize its
policies and structures with the EU. Thus, each chapter carries with it certain costs of adaptation.
Depending on the characteristics of the Candidate, these costs may be high in some areas and
low in others. Furthermore, it is not possible for the EU to know in advance how costly it is
going to be for the Candidate to carry out all the necessary reforms since the costs depend on
the interaction of di¤erent domestic and transnational interests groups, and their inuence on the
candidate countrys government. As an outsider, the EU does not have enough information about
the domestic politics of the Candidate to know what kind of opposition each reform project will
face in the candidate country, and how costly it will be to overcome that opposition. Since the
uncertainty stems from lack of information about the workings of the candidate countrys domestic
politics, the Candidate does not su¤er from the same informational gap. So, in our game we have
an informational asymmetry.
Although the EU does not have complete information about the costs of reforms, she has
her belief in terms of a probability distribution on the possible levels of costs. She believes the
adaptation costs for the Candidate are either high or low. We will denote the probability the EU
assigns to the costs being low as p; where p is a random variable continuously distributed over the
interval (0; 1). Since the EU is not monolithic, and there is variation among members over possible
costs, one can think of this p as reecting the strength of the coalition of member states who
perceive the costs low. And, this information is public, that is to say, the Candidate is perfectly
informed about the EUs belief about her costs of adjustment.
In light of the EUs belief structure we can say that the Candidate can be one of the two types;
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a high-cost candidate, or a low-cost candidate. When the negotiations start the EU is uncertain
about which type she is facing. We will denote the cost of closing chapter j with j , where j > 0
for all j 2 f1; 2g. The total cost of adjustment for a candidate is then going to be  = 1 + 2:
Since we have two possible cost structures, we will denote the costs of adjustment for a high-cost
candidate with (hc), where (hc) = 1(hc) + 2(hc) and the costs of adjustment for a low-cost
candidate with (lc), where (lc) = 1(lc) + 2(lc) with 1(hc) > 1(lc) and 2(hc) > 2(lc):
The accession negotiations cover various areas, and reforms in each area di¤er in terms of their
costs. In some areas, the candidate might already be close to the EU standards necessitating some
minor transformations, or the issue may be of interest to a relatively few and not so powerful
interest groups, which enables the candidate country to carry out the reforms easily. Whereas in
others, the reforms may require substantial changes generating strong oppositions from numerous
interest groups. An example of an easy chapter might be the one on science and research, a
chapter that Turkey opened and provisionally closed with relative ease in June 2006. Whereas
negotiations on four freedoms and agriculture usually last longer and are more heated. In line
with this characteristic of the accession negotiations we will assume that in our two-chapter game,
chapter 1 is less costly to adopt than chapter 2, that is, 2(hc) > 1(hc) and 2(lc) > 1(lc):
Note that the cost of closing a certain chapter will be di¤erent for di¤erent candidate countries.
The EU may be able to compare candidate countries in terms of their closing costs for a chapter.
That is, the EU may know very well that it will be more costly for Candidate A than Candidate
B to close chapter 2. But, being able to make this comparison does not really help the EU to
gure out the types of the candidates (that is, whether they are high-cost or low-cost). Such an
assessment requires the EU to know exactly how costly it is going to be for Candidate A and B to
carry out all the necessary reforms for chapter 2.
Upon the completion of the screening process the Commission presents the DCP to the Candi-
date. The negotiation game starts when the Candidate responds to the DCP with a position paper
declaring whether she is willing to go through all the required transformations presented in the
DCP or not. For those chapters she adopts without contest, she fully assumes the associated costs
of harmonization. If she nds the requirements of a specic chapter too costly to be applicable she
can always call on to the EU to reconsider that chapter and help her in closing it by reducing the
requirements of the chapter. In other words, she may demand support. In the formal EU language,
this corresponds to situations where the Candidate asks for derogations, safeguard clauses, specic
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arrangements, or transitional periods, or simply to situations where she leaves some conditions
unfullled1. If the Commission and the Council accept the Candidates demand then this implies
they are willing to let in a candidate whose structures and/or policies are not exactly in congru-
ence with the EU norms in some areas. This can be interpreted as the EU assuming the costs of
harmonization, because once a candidate becomes a member, her deviations from the EU policies,
norms and structures start a¤ecting all other member states. A new member whose preferences
on a specic issue diverge from existing memberspreferences may block decision making in that
issue area as Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003) and Plumper et al. (2005) argue. The Cyprus mem-
bership is a perfect example of such a situation. The European Council by deciding to accept the
Cypriot accession disregarding the fact that Cyprus was short of fullling the Common Foreign and
Security Policy chapter, in a sense imported the age-old Cyprus problem and made it its own. So,
now the costs of solving that problem have fallen on the member statesshoulders. On the other
hand, the EU can always reject demands for support and insist that the Candidate do all that is
necessary before closing a chapter. Faced with a rejection a candidate has the option to withdraw
her demand but at the cost of losing face domestically. We will assume that the Candidate incurs
domestic audience costs (Fearon, 94) in case she withdraws a demand for transitional measures
that has been rejected by the EU. We will denote this cost by c, where c > 0. It can be argued
that the domestic audience cost should be di¤erent for each chapter depending on the size of the
constituency the chapter a¤ects. Although this is a valid argument, the inclusion of chapter spe-
cic audience costs do not add to the explanatory power of our model so for the sake of simplicity
we assume constant audience costs. Note that the audience cost assumption also has embedded
in it a further assumption that the domestic constituency (which can be di¤erent interest groups
depending on the subject) is fully informed about the negotiation process. This may, in some cases,
be a strong assumption, but since we are only interested in the uncertainty on the Unions part,
for the sake of being parsimonious, we assume the constituency is fully informed.
Finally, to dene the preference relations of the players, we will assume that the EU receives a
positive payo¤ from the accession of a candidate that has gone through all the necessary transfor-
1 It can be argued that transitional periods only postpone the costs for a candidate rather than transfering them
to the EU. But as Moravcsik and Vachodova (2003) argue, once a candidate becomes a member we should expect the
new member to deploy her voting and veto power to transfer resources to herself to ease the pain of transformation.
In other words, we should expect her to try to shift the burden of her deviations from the EU policies, norms and
structures to other member states.
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mations required within the chapters. A perfect illustration was provided with Swedish, Austrian,
and Finnish accession talks where almost none of the chapters required signicant adaptation and
the EU reaped positive payo¤s from their membership. This would probably be the case if Norway
or Switzerland decided to join, even though they do not intend to in the near future. We will denote
the EUs payo¤ with v, where v > 02: Similarly, we will assume that the Candidate receives a posi-
tive payo¤ from becoming a member of the EU or else she would not have applied for membership.
We will denote the Candidates payo¤ with u, where u > 0.
The net payo¤ to each player depends on the amount of transformation the Candidate goes
through to become a member. If the Candidate agrees to adopt all chapters in their entirety, then
the EU receives v; whereas the Candidate receives u  (hc) or u  (lc) depending on whether she
is a low-cost or a high-cost candidate. Similarly, if the Candidate declares in her position papers
that she needs support from the EU in terms of nancial compensation or time, for one or both
chapters, and if the EU accepts these demands, then the net payo¤ the EU receives is calculated by
deducting from v the costs of those chapters that are provisionally closed without all the necessary
adaptations. On the other hand, the net payo¤ the Candidate receives is calculated by deducting
from u the costs of chapters she adopted in their entirety. To give an example, if a low-cost
type candidate adopts chapter 1 in its entirety, and demands transitional measures for chapter 2,
and if the EU accepts her demand, then the Candidate receives u   1(lc), and the EU receives
v 2(lc). One can always argue that the costs of adjustment for the Candidate and the costs to the
EU of accepting demands for transitional measures are not necessarily the same3. This argument
is completely valid, but incorporating it in our model only introduces further notation without
changing the results as long as we work under the assumption (which we will specify shortly) that
there exists a chapter(s) for which transitional measures are too costly for the EU to ease.
In terms of costs and benets of membership, we will assume the following relations;
1. u  (lc) > 0 and u  2(lc)  c > 0 but u  (lc)  c < 0, which implies that a low-
cost type candidate would be willing to accept the adaptation and harmonization to the acquis
2Note that we do not necessarily assume uniform payo¤ for the EU as a whole. The payo¤ from the accesion of
the Candidate can di¤er for each member state. The payo¤ v then can be thought of as the total payo¤ that accrues
to the member states.
3There may be numerous reasons for why the costs should di¤er for the Candidate and the EU, one of which is
that there may also be audience costs for the EU (or for some EU members) associated with accepting transitional
measures. We thank the anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.
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in order to become a member of the EU, but this willingness would be compromised if the
EU rejects all her demands in terms of transitional measures and the Candidate has to bear
domestic audience costs. The 1994 Norwegian referendum is a case in point. Although a low-
cost candidate who could have handled the adaptation and harmonization to the acquis very
easily, Norway did not become a member as the Norwegian public declared negative opinion,
which stemmed mostly from the negotiations on the EUs policy on sheries, monetary union,
and institutional decision making, as well as the Norwegian fear of losing sovereignty (Geyer,
1997; Sogner and Archer, 1995).
2. u  1(hc) > 0; and u  1(hc)  c > 0 which implies that a high-cost type candidate
would be willing to adopt the easy chapter in its entirety. The relative ease of negotiations
on chapters like science and research for most applicants veries this assumption.
3. u   2(hc) < 0; which implies that a high-cost type candidate would nd the costs of
adopting the di¢ cult chapter in its entirety too high. Poland, for example, requested and was
granted transitional arrangements on the agriculture chapter. Similarly, she got transitional
arrangements for her state aid policies under the competition policy chapter. We will also
examine the case in which this assumption is reversed.
4. v (lc) > 0; which implies that the EU would be willing to let in a low-cost type candidate
even if she does not go through all the necessary transformations. The rational behind such
an attitude is that a low-cost type candidate would already be close to the EU norms with
little left to do. And that little can be taken care of later relatively easily. Negotiations
with Austria can be seen as an example in line with this assumption; Austrian requests like
limitations on the lorry tra¢ c through its territory and on the right of EU citizens to buy
property in Austria were all accepted by the EU (Granell, 1995).
5. v 1(hc) > 0 which implies that the EU would be willing to help out a high-cost candidate
with the adjustment costs of the easy chapter. An example would be the transitional measures
given to Poland in terms of competition in postal services.
6. v   2(hc) < 0 which implies that the EU would not be willing to let in a high-cost type
candidate who has not completed the required reforms for the di¢ cult chapter. The insistence
of the EU on the closure of the Temelin nuclear plant in Czech Republic makes a case in point.
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The EUs decision to suspend negotiations on eight chapters until Turkey opens up her ports
to the Republic of Cyprus is another example.
In the following section we will construct the extensive form of the game we have described so
far, under the assumption that all chapters are opened simultaneously. We will be looking for the
pure strategy sequential equilibria of this game. Then, in the next section, we will switch to the
assumption that the chapters are opened one-by-one and we will construct our game accordingly.
We will rst look at this game under the assumption that the easy chapter is opened rst. Then
we will analyze the case when the di¢ cult chapter goes rst. In both games we will nd the pure
strategy sequential equilibria. As we discussed above, only the game in which the easy chapter is
opened rst reects the real life negotiation design. We analyze the other two designs to unearth the
rationals behind the actual one, and to see whether it can be improved upon. Before comparing
these di¤erent games, we will also consider the case when Assumption 3 is reversed, i.e., when
u   2(hc) > 0; which implies that the benet of becoming a member outweighs the costs of
adjustment for the di¢ cult chapter even for a high-cost type candidate. We will investigate if this
makes a di¤erence in terms of equilibrium behavior of players. Finally, in the concluding section
we will compare these three designs from the point of view of both the EU and the Candidate.
3.1 The Simultaneous Chapters Game
In the negotiation game where the chapters are all opened simultaneously, the Candidate (CD) is
faced with the choice among adopting them both in their entirety, adopting one in its entirety while
demanding transitional measures for the other, and demanding transitional measures for both. In
other words, the action set of the Candidate, ACD; is;
ACD =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Demand transitional measures for both chapters (DTB),
Adopt chapter 1 in its entirety and demand transitional measures for chapter 2 (Ad1,Dt2),
Adopt chapter 2 in its entirety and demand transitional measures for chapter 1 (Ad2,Dt1),
Adopt both chapters in their entirety (ADB)
If the Candidate adopts all the chapters in their entirety, then the game ends with the Candidate
assuming all the costs of adjustment. If, on the other hand, the Candidate demands transitional
measures for one or both chapters then the EU is to decide whether to accept this demand (Ac)
or reject it (Re). But this decision has to be made in an environment with incomplete information
since the EU does not know the type of the candidate with certainty. In other words, there is
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uncertainty about the costs of letting the Candidate in before she fullls the necessary conditions
completely. Faced with this uncertainty the EU decides according to her beliefs about the type of
the Candidate. If the EU accepts the Candidates demand for transitional measures, she assumes
the costs of adjustment for the chapter(s) for which the demand was made. The Candidate then
assumes the cost of the remaining chapter which she has acquiesced (if she did so for any) to
adopt in its entirety. If, on the other hand, the EU rejects the Candidates demand for transitional
measures then the Candidate can either backdown (Bd) and adopt both chapters in their entirety,
or decide to leave the negotiation table (Ex). In case she backsdown, she pays a xed domestic
political audience cost c.
We will be looking at the pure strategy sequential equilibria of this game which is depicted in
Figure.1.
Proposition 1 When p is su¢ ciently large, that is, when the EU believes that the Candidate is a
low-cost type with a high probability, (p > p = (hc) v(hc) (lc)); the simultaneous chapters game, depicted
in Figure 1, has pure strategy sequential equilibria in which the Candidate, regardless of her type,
demands transitional measures for both chapters and the EU accepts her demand. All costs of
adjustment are assumed by the EU. In terms of payo¤s, the Candidate receives u, whereas the EU
receives [p(v   (lc)) + (1  p)(v   (hc))]:
Proposition 2 When p is smaller than the above critical value p; but is still su¢ ciently large
(p > p > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc)); the simultaneous chapters game, depicted in Figure 1, has a pure
strategy sequential equilibrium in which the Candidate, regardless of her type, joins the EU after
only incurring the costs of adjustment for the easy chapter. She demands transitional measures
for the di¢ cult chapter and the EU accepts her demand. The costs of adjustment for the di¢ cult
chapter are assumed by the EU. In terms of payo¤s, a low-cost candidate receives (u   1(lc)), a
high-cost candidate receives (u  1(hc)), and the EU receives [p(v   2(lc)) + (1  p)(v   2(hc)]:
Proposition 3 When p is su¢ ciently small (p < p) the only pure strategy sequential equilibria
of the simultaneous chapters game, depicted in Figure 1, are such that only a low-cost candidate
joins the EU after fullling all the requirements of the di¢ cult chapter on her own. She demands
transitional measures for the easy chapter and the EU accepts her demand. A high-cost candidate,
on the other hand, leaves the table after her demand for transitional measures for the di¢ cult
chapter gets rejected by the EU. In terms of payo¤s, a low-cost candidate receives (u   2(lc)), a
high-cost candidate receives 0, and the EU receives p(v   1(lc)):
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Figure 1: Simultaneous chapters game
14
Proofs. See Appendix.
The simultaneous chapters game subjects the EU to the risk of letting in a high-cost Candidate
while taking on all her adjustment costs when she believes she is facing a low-cost type candidate
with a high probability, that is when p is su¢ ciently large. When p is smaller that risk vanishes,
but for p > p there still remains the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 ; which means that the
EU still su¤ers the risk of taking on a high-cost candidates costs of adjustment for the di¢ cult
chapter. Only when p is su¢ ciently small the game becomes immune to pooling equilibria, and the
EU then can separate a high-cost candidate from a low-cost one.
3.2 The Chapter-by-Chapter Game
There are two ways to design the chapter-by-chapter negotiation game depending on whether the
easy or the di¢ cult chapter is opened up for negotiation rst. We will start by analyzing the game
in which the easy chapter is opened up rst.
3.2.1 The Easy Chapter Goes First
The game starts with the opening up of (the less costly) Chapter 1. The candidate is faced with
a choice between adopting the chapter in its entirety (Ad1) and demanding transitional measures
for it (Dt1). Her demand, presented in her position paper, then is evaluated by the EU who can
reject (Re) or accept it (Ac). If faced with a rejection the Candidate then decides whether to back
down (Bd) from her demand or to leave the table (Ex). Backing down, as it was the case in the
simultaneous-chapters game, carries with it a domestic political audience cost. Negotiations on
Chapter 2 start only after the provisional closure of Chapter 1. Negotiations on the second chapter
follow exactly the same structure as the negotiations on the rst chapter. The Candidate choses
either to adopt the chapter in its entirety (Ad2) or demand transitional measures for it (Dt2). If
the Candidate demands transitional measures, the EU is then to decide whether to accept this
demand (Ac) or reject it (Re). If the EU rejects her demand then the Candidate decides whether
to backdown (Bd) or to leave the table (Ex).
Proposition 4 The chapter-by-chapter game, depicted in Figure 2, does not have any equilibrium
in which all costs are assumed by the EU. Thus the Candidate can not join the EU without incurring
any costs.
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Figure 2: Chapter-by-Chapter Game. The easy chapter is opened up rst.
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Proposition 5 When p is su¢ ciently large (p > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc)); the chapter-by-chapter game,
depicted in Figure 2, has a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in which the Candidate, regardless
of her type, joins the EU after only incurring the costs of adjustment for the easy chapter. The
costs of adjustment for the di¢ cult chapter are assumed by the EU. In terms of payo¤s, a low-cost
candidate receives (u   1(lc)), a high-cost candidate receives (u   1(hc)), and the EU receives
[p(v   2(lc)) + (1  p)(v   2(hc)]:
Proposition 6 When p is su¢ ciently small (p < p) the only pure strategy sequential equilibria of
the chapter-by-chapter game, depicted in Figure 2, are such that only a low-cost candidate joins the
EU after fullling all the requirements of the di¢ cult chapter on her own. She demands transitional
measures for the easy chapter and the EU accepts her demand. A high-cost candidate, on the other
hand, leaves the table after her demand for transitional measures for the di¢ cult chapter gets
rejected by the EU. In terms of payo¤s, a low-cost candidate receives (u   2(lc)), a high-cost
candidate receives 0, and the EU receives p(v   1(lc)):
Proofs. See Appendix.
The chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the less costly chapter is free of any equilibrium
in which the EU assumes all costs of adjustment. But it still subjects the EU to the risk of taking on
the adjustment costs of a high-cost candidate for the di¢ cult chapter when p > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) :
That risk only vanishes when p < p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) . Then all sequential equilibria are separating
which means the EU can tell a high-cost candidate from a low-cost one, and act accordingly.
3.2.2 The Di¢ cult Chapter Goes First
In this case, the chapter-by-chapter game starts with negotiations on (the more costly) Chapter 2
rst.
Proposition 7 The chapter-by-chapter game in Figure 3 which starts with the di¢ cult chapter has
a unique pure strategy sequential equilibrium in which only a low-cost type candidate joins the EU
after adopting the di¢ cult chapter in its entirety. A high-cost type candidate leaves the negotiations
after her demand for transitional measures for the di¢ cult chapter gets rejected by the EU. In terms
of payo¤s, the Candidate receives u  2(lc) if she is a low-cost type and 0 if she is a high-cost type.
The EU receives [p(v   1(lc))]:
Proof. See Appendix.
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Figure 3: The Chapter-by-Chapter Game. The di¢ cult chapter is opened up rst.
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The chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the di¢ cult chapter has a unique equilibrium
and it is a separating one. Thus it eliminates all the risk for the EU that comes with a possible
pooling equilibrium. In this game there are no possible gains for a high-cost type candidate from
mimicking a low-cost type. So, the types diverge in their choices enabling the EU to know who she
is dealing with rather than having to make guesses. Once certain about the Candidates type, the
EU then can safely decide to allow in a low-cost candidate with minimum compromise.
3.3 Changing The Assumptions
So far we have assumed that a high-cost candidate country would be unwilling to adopt the di¢ cult
chapter in its entirety because the costs of adjustment would surpass the benets of becoming a
member. An interesting question is what happens if this is not so, that is, if the benets of becoming
a member outweighs the costs of adjustment for the di¢ cult chapter even for a high cost candidate.
In formal notation, we will be looking at the case when u  2(hc) > 0. Would it make a di¤erence
in terms of equilibrium behavior?
Proposition 8 Under the assumption that u   2(hc) > 0; the simultaneous chapters game, de-
picted in Figure 1, still has pure strategy sequential equilibria in which the EU assumes all or most
of the costs of adjustment.
Proof. See Appendix.
The simultaneous chapters game still carries the risks for the EU of letting in a high-cost
candidate while taking on all her adjustment costs if p > p; and most of her costs if p > p > p. It
does not matter whether the Candidate can handle the costs of adjustment all by herself or not.
As long as there is a possibility that the EU will be willing to help out, and the Candidate will ask
for that help subjecting the EU to the risk of saying yes to a candidate that will turn out to be too
costly.
Proposition 9 Under the assumption that u  2(hc) > 0; the chapter-by-chapter game that starts
with the easy chapter, depicted in Figure 2, still has a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in which
the EU assumes most of the costs of adjustment.
Proof. See Appendix.
The chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the easy chapter still has a risky equilibrium for
the EU in which the EU accepts the demands of a high-cost Candidate and takes on the costs of
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adjustment for the di¢ cult chapter.
Proposition 10 Under the assumption that u 2(hc) > 0; the chapter-by-chapter game that starts
with the di¢ cult chapter has a unique pure strategy sequential equilibrium in which the Candidate,
regardless of her type, joins the EU after adopting the di¢ cult chapter in its entirety. She demands
transitional measures for the easy chapter and the EU accepts her demand. In terms of payo¤s,
then, the Candidate receives u  2(lc) if she is a low-cost type and u  2(hc) if she is a high-cost
type, whereas the EU receives [p(v   1(lc)) + (1  p)(u  1(hc))]:
Proof. See Appendix.
This unique equilibrium is only di¤erent from the one under the initial assumption in terms of
the behavior of a high-cost candidate. This time she stays in the game and joins the EU after she
adopts the di¢ cult chapter in its entirety.
4 DISCUSSION
We have analyzed three di¤erent design alternatives the EU can employ to conduct accession nego-
tiations with candidate countries: the negotiations can be conducted simultaneously on all chapters
of the acquis; they can be conducted chapter-by-chapter starting with the easy chapters; and they
can be conducted chapter-by-chapter starting with the di¢ cult chapters. The possible outcomes
in all these three games that we have analyzed so far simply determine how costly enlargement is
going to be for the EU, and for a candidate. In that sense, there are only three types of outcomes,
and three payo¤ structures that can be obtained in any equilibrium in which enlargement actually
takes place: either the EU supports the candidate in all necessary transformations (call this "equi-
librium type 1"); or she gives support with the di¢ cult issues while the candidate handles the easy
ones on her own (equilibrium type 2); or she gives support with the easy issues while the candidate
handles the di¢ cult ones with her own resources (equilibrium type 3). Adopting all chapters in
their entirety is suboptimal for the candidate under the current assumptions, so it is not a possible
equilibrium outcome. And, in reality no country joined the EU without getting transitional periods
and/or safeguard clauses for several chapters.
The EU gets the highest payo¤ from a type 3 equilibrium. She gets the second highest payo¤
from a type 2 equilibrium; and the lowest payo¤ from a type 1 equilibrium. Conversely, the
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candidate gets the highest payo¤ from a type 1 equilibrium; the second highest from a type 2
equilibrium; and the lowest payo¤ from a type 3 equilibrium.
Our analyses demonstrate that:
 If the EU believes a candidate to be high-cost with a high probability (p > p), that is, if the
EU believes that the candidate will most probably not be able to handle the di¢ cult chapters
then there will be no di¤erence in terms of equilibrium outcomes for the EU no matter which
of the three ways the negotiations are designed. In such a case, any design choice is rational
on the EUs part;
 If the EU believes a candidate to be low-cost with high probability (p > p), she should prefer
a chapter-by-chapter negotiation rather than the simultaneous chapter openings as the latter
may result in a low-payo¤ equilibrium. Thus, the EUs decision to conduct the negotiations
chapter-by-chapter rather than negotiating over all the chapters simultaneously is rational.
If the EU believes that the probability that a candidate can make all the necessary reforms
included in the chapters is high, then by negotiating chapter-by-chapter, the EU shields herself
from the risk of possible low payo¤ outcomes;
 If the EU believes a candidate to be low-cost with high probability (p > p); she can further
reduce the risk she is subject to, by starting the negotiations with di¢ cult chapters. Such a
design choice eliminates any risk of ending up in a type 2 equilibrium. This, however, is an
interesting result of our analyses, because the EU has so far chosen to begin the accession
negotiations with the relatively easier chapters, thereby exposing herself to higher risks and
costs.
These three results raise three important questions:
1. The rst question is whether the design currently in place is a rational choice on the part
of the EU given the uncertainty surrounding the compatibility of Turkey as a member. The
above results tells us that it is a rational design if EU members believe Turkey to be a high-
cost candidate with high probability (p > p). And all the discussion about the Turkish
candidacy indicates that they do so.4
4One can also argue that by starting with easy chapters the EU might be trying to increase the partiescommitment
to the negotiation process and to build momentum to make it easier for the candidate to accept the costs of the di¢ cult
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2. The second question is about the invariation in the negotiation design over time. Former
candidates also have gone through chapter-by-chapter negotiations, and they have started
the negotiations with the easier chapters. Our analyses demonstrate that once there is uncer-
tainty about the type of a candidate, chapter-by-chapter negotiations starting with the easy
chapters is only optimal when the EU members believe the candidate to be high-cost with a
high probability (p > p). But, considering the previous enlargements, such a belief for all
the former candidates is higly unlikely. Did EU members believe Sweden to be high-cost?
Probably not. But then the EU should have started the negotiations with Sweden with the
di¢ cult chapters to shield herself from a type 2 equilibrium. Our explanation for this appar-
ent irrationality is that the negotiation design is relevant only when there is uncertainty about
the type of a candidate. As we have discussed at the very beginning of the article, the risks
for the EU originate from the asymmetric distribution of information. The EU runs the risk
of confusing a high-cost candidate with a low-cost one because she is just not able to tell for
sure how costly it is going to be for the Candidate to adapt to the EU ways of doing things.
If there is no such uncertainty, that is, if the EU has enough information on the Candidate,
then there is no risk of confusion to begin with. And then it does not really matter which
negotiation design is being used. One can argue that the extensive cultural, economical, and
historical ties of the EU members with most of the former applicants eradicated informa-
tional asymmetries that could have a¤ected their membership negotiations. Interestingly, in
Turkeys case those ties are not as strong and extensive, and hence we see the discussion
about whether Turkey belongs to Europe or not.
3. The nal question we raise is whether this argument about the absence of uncertainty was
valid for all previous candidates before Turkey. In other words, can we explain the lack
of change in the negotiation design with absence of uncertainty in all former cases before
Turkey? We argue that we can not, and that in some cases the EU should have started the
negotiations with the di¢ cult chapters in order to protect itself from the risk of a type 2
equilibrium. The accession of Cyprus is a good example of such an outcome. Cyprus was
mistakenly seen as a low-cost candidate and was let in without fullling the requirements of
some di¢ cult chapters like the common foreign and security policy. But the high cost of the
chapter(s). Because we have assumed the chapter closings to be independent of each other, our model does not allow
us to study such commitment e¤ects of various negotiation designs.
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incongruence of preferences between Cyprus and other members became obvious soon after
Cyprus became a member (Ho¤meister, 2006).
Why did not the EU switched to a less risky negotiation design then? Here the answer lies in
the fact that enlargement up until now happened in waves (Friis, 2005). There the decision was
not about which design to use with each candidate but rather which design to use with all of them.
Thus, it was a completely di¤erent calculation than the simple, one candidate country, cost-benet
analysis we employed here. Each time the EU was to decide on whether to accept or reject a
demand from a candidate country, she was to think about possible repercussions of her decision
on negotiations with others in the same group. Similarly, each candidate in a group of candidates
was to act strategically and consider the past and possible future moves of other candidates before
acting. In short, the decision to switch to an alternative negotiation design with a candidate while
negotiating with a group of candidates simultaneously was not simply based on the characteristics
of that candidate, but rather on the characteristics of the whole group. The Commission and the
Council could have employed a di¤erent negotiation design with Cyprus. They could have made
the opening up of chapters conditional on the successful closure of the common foreign and security
policy chapter rst. Given that a substantial coalition of EU members were at best skeptical about
the suitableness of the Republic of Cyprus given the situation on the island, this would have been
a rational choice, but only if the EU was negotiating with the Republic of Cyprus in isolation. The
fact that there were other negotiations running simultaneously made this option infeasible. What
is more, the possibility of a Greek veto on Central and Eastern European enlargement eliminated
conditional closures for Cyprus (Stefanou, 2005).
From the viewpoint of the Candidate, it is obvious that she should insist on simultaneous
chapter openings if she knows that the EU member states believe her to be low-cost, which might
be the case for a small and economically developed state with close cultural and historical ties with
EU members, but which is certainly not the case for Turkey. That means Turkey would not have
beneted from a simultaneous chapter openings. Still, if it turns out to be the case that p > p;
that is if Turkey can persuade a su¢ cient number EU member states that she can adjust to the EU
standards relatively easily, and that she is not that di¤erent, or that her membership is worth the
costs that may come with it, then Turkey can benet from the current design by shifting some of the
burden of adjustment for the di¢ cult chapters to the EU by demanding transitional arrangements
for those chapters.
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Our results support Koremenos et al.s (2001) rational institution design conjecture that re-
strictive membership increases with uncertainty about preferences. Koremenos et al. argue that
Membership enables states to learn about each otherspreferences if the membership mechanism
can distinguish cooperators from noncooperators...E¤ective membership rules create a separating
equilibrium where only those who share certain characteristics will bear the costs necessary to be
included in an equilibrium.. We have shown that when the EU is certain about the type of the
candidate country it is indi¤erent amongst alternative designs, but once uncertainty is introduced
she prefers to conduct chapter-by-chapter negotiations rather than negotiating all chapters simul-
tanously, to gather more information about the candidate. This in a sense tightens membership
requirements as it takes away the candidates opportunity to misrepresent its type.
Our model also provides a detailed framework for Plumper et al.s (2005) argument that in
order to gain the necessary information about the distribution of policy preferences in applicant
countries, current EU countries observe how candidate states fare in closing the chapters of the
acquis during accession negotiations . Our model explains why and how this observation takes
place.
Note that our model can be adapted to study accession to other international institutions
with membership conditionality like the NATO, or the WTO. As Koremenos et al. argue, these
organizations also use their membership conditionality as signals to dissolve their uncertainty about
the preferences of prospective members.
As a nal word we should mention an implicit assumption that goes with our analysis, namely
that the chapters are independent of each other. In other words, we have assumed so far that the
costs associated with closing a chapter are xed and independent of previously closed chapters. One
can always argue that closing of each chapter creates positive spillovers for subsequent chapters.
As a country follows the path of transformation it becomes more and more easy to harmonize the
remaining issues. Such a dependency among chapters provides a good explanation for why the
EU insists on starting the accession negotiations with relatively easy chapters even though starting
with the di¢ cult chapters would be better in terms of resolving possible uncertainties the EU may
have about the candidate. The dependency argument can be incorporated in our model through
relating the costs of chapters to the number and di¢ culty of previously closed ones. But that is an
extension we will leave for a future study.
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5 APPENDIX
In this section we will nd the pure strategy sequential equilibria of the simultaneous chapters
game, the chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the easy chapter, and the chapter-by-chapter
game that starts with the di¢ cult chapter respectively. The analysis hence conducted constitutes
the proofs of the Propositions in the previous sections.
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5.1 Equilibrium Analysis
5.1.1 The Simultaneous Chapters Game
The equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous-chapters game constitutes the proofs of Proposi-
tion 1,2,3, and 8. We will start by applying backward induction to the simultaneous chapters
game depicted in Figure 1. Since both u   (lc)   c < 0 and u   (hc)   c < 0; we know that
the Candidate will never back down when rejected by the EU. Knowing this the EU will (i)
accept at information set 1 if q > p = (hc) v(hc) (lc) ; and reject if q < p, (ii) accept at information
set 2 for all t 2 [0; 1] since (v   1(lc)) > 0 and (v   1(hc)) > 0; (iii) accept at information set
3 if r > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) ; and reject if r < p
, where q, t, and r stand for the probability the
EU assigns in her information set 1, 2, and 3 respectively, to the Candidate being a low-cost type.
We will not be discussing the cases where the EUs beliefs equal critical values. Since we have
restricted our attention to pure strategy equilibria such a discussion would not have added any new
equilibrium to our results. Moreover, those cases represent a zero measure subset of possible beliefs
which further justies our omission.
Lemma 11 p = (hc) v(hc) (lc) > p
 = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) :
Proof. First note that 1(hc)1(hc) 1(lc) > 1 >
2(hc) v
2(hc) 2(lc) : Also, 1(hc) > 0, 1(hc)   1(lc) > 0,
2(hc)  v > 0, and 2(hc)  2(lc) > 0. Thus, 1(hc)[2(hc)  2(lc)] > [1(hc)  1(lc)][2(hc)  v]:
Adding [2(hc)  v][2(hc)  2(lc)] to both sides, we obtain
[1(hc) + 2(hc)  v][2(hc)  2(lc)] > [1(hc)  1(lc) + 2(hc)  2(lc)][2(hc)  v]:
This implies p = 1(hc)+2(hc) v1(hc)+2(hc) 1(lc) 2(lc) >
2(hc) v
2(hc) 2(lc) = p
:
Given that the EU will accept transitional measures for Chapter 1, adopting both chapters as
they are (ADB) becomes suboptimal for the candidate. Now we will go through the possible pure
strategies of the EU and the Candidates best responses to those strategies to nd the sequential
equilibria of this game.
Lemma 12 The strategy prole  = (EU ; CD(hc); CD(lc)), where
EU = faccept all demands}
CD(hc) = CD(lc) = fdemand transitional measures for both chapters, exit if any demand is rejected}
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with the original probability distribution such that p > p = (hc) v(hc) (lc) ; and the EUs belief structure
as q = p and r > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. The equilibrium
outcome is for the EU to assume all the costs of adjustment. The Candidate joins the EU with no
costs. She receives u; whereas the EU receives [p(v   (lc)) + (1  p)(v   (hc))]:
Proof. For the EU to accept demands for transitional measures at all her information sets, it
must be that q > p and r > p: Given that the EU accepts all demands, the best response of the
Candidate is to demand transitional measures for both chapters regardless of her type which then
implies that q = p. So, for p > p, this is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
Note that this equilibrium is valid when u 2(hc) > 0 as well. Since u > u 1(hc) > u 2(hc)
and u > u  1(lc) > u  2(lc), given that the EU accept such demands the Candidate prefers to
demand transitional measures for both chapters regardless of her type and her ability to adopt the
chapters in their entirety.
Lemma 13 The strategy prole  = (EU ; CD(hc); CD(lc));where
EU =
8>>><>>>:
accept "transitional measures for both chaptersdemands,
accept "transitional measures for Chapter 1 onlydemands,
reject "transitional measures for Chapter 2 onlydemands.
CD(hc) = CD(lc) = fdemand transitional measures for both chapters, exit if demand is rejected}
with the original probability distribution such that p > p; and the EUs belief structure as q = p and
r < p is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is for the EU to assume
all the costs of adjustment. The Candidate joins the EU with no cost. She receives u; whereas the
EU receives [p(v   (lc)) + (1  p)(v   (hc))]:
Proof. Under this strategy the EU accepts at information sets 1 and 2 and rejects at information
set 3, which implies that q > p and r < p: The best response for the Candidate is again to demand
transitional measures for both chapters which implies q = p: So, for p > p, this is a pure strategy
sequential equilibrium.
Note that this equilibrium is valid when u   2(hc) > 0 as well. Since u > u   1(hc) and
u > u 1(lc), given that the EU accept such demands the Candidate prefers to demand transitional
measures for both chapters regardless of her type and her ability to adopt the chapters in their
entirety.
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Lemma 14 The strategy prole  = (EU ; CD(hc); CD(lc)) where
EU =
8>>><>>>:
reject "transitional measures for both chaptersdemands,
accept "transitional measures for Chapter 1 onlydemands,
accept "transitional measures for Chapter 2 onlydemands.
CD(hc) = CD(lc) =
8<: adopt Chapter 1 in its entirety and demand transitional measures for Chapter 2,exit if any demand is rejected.
with the original probability distribution such that p > p > p; and the EUs belief structure as
q < p and r > p is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is for the EU
to assume the costs of adjustment for the more costly chapter, whereas the Candidate assumes the
costs for the less costly chapter, i.e., the Candidate receives u  1(hc) if she is a high-cost type and
u  1(lc) if she is a low-cost type, and the EU receives [p(v   2(lc)) + (1  p)(v   2(hc))]:
Proof. Under this strategy the EU rejects demands at information set 1 and accepts at information
sets 2 and 3. Given the EUs strategy, the best response for both types of the Candidate is to adopt
the easy chapter in its entirety and demand transitional measures for the di¢ cult one (Ad1Dt2):
Given that both types choose Ad1Dt2; the EUs belief at the third information set should be r = p
and since we have already assumed that p > p the EUs choice of action is consistent with its
belief which is consistent with the play of the game.
Note that this equilibrium is valid when u 2(hc) > 0 as well. Since u 1(hc) > u 2(hc) and
u  1(lc) > u  2(lc), given that the EU accept such demands the Candidate prefers to demand
transitional measures for the di¢ cult chapter regardless of her type and her ability to adopt the
chapters in their entirety.
Lemma 15 The strategy prole  = (EU ; CD(hc); CD(lc)) where
EU =
8>>><>>>:
reject "transitional measures for both chaptersdemands,
accept "transitional measures for Chapter 1 onlydemands,
reject "transitional measures for Chapter 2 onlydemands.
CD(hc) =
8<: adopt Chapter 1 in its entirety and demand transitional measures for Chapter 2,exit if any demand is rejected.
CD(lc) =
8<: adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety and demand transitional measures in Chapter 1,exit if any demand is rejected.
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with the original probability distribution such that p 2 (0; 1); and the EUs belief structure as q < p
and r < p is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. So in the equilibrium outcome, the Candidate
joins the EU if she is a low-cost type. She assumes the cost for the more costly Chapter 2 and
gets support from the EU to provisionally close the less costly Chapter 1. Whereas a high-cost type
candidate leaves the table after her demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2 gets rejected by
the EU. The Candidate receives u  2(lc) if she is a low-cost type and 0 if she is a high-cost type.
The EU receives [p(v   1(lc))]:
Proof. In order for the EUs above strategy to be consistent with her beliefs it must be that q < p
and r < p: Given the EUs strategy, a low-cost type candidate prefers to adopt the di¢ cult chapter
in its entirety and ask transitional measures only for the easy chapter since u   2(lc) > 0. But
since u  2(hc) < 0; a high-cost candidate prefers to demand transitional measures for the di¢ cult
Chapter 2 even though she knows her demand will get rejected and she will then have to exit the
game. Since only a high-cost candidate demands transitional measures in Chapter 2 under these
conditions, when faced with such a demand the EU will know she is facing a high-cost type for
sure which implies r = 0 and t = p. Note that p > 0 = r and the EUs decision to accept in her
information set 2 is valid for all t 2 (0; 1). Moreover information set 1 lies o¤ the equilibrium path
so any belief is consistent with the play of the game. Then we can say the EUs beliefs are also
consistent with the play of the game. Thus, this is a sequential equilibrium.
Note that this equilibrium is not valid when u   2(hc) > 0. Because then adopting Chapter
1 in its entirety and demanding transitional measures for Chapter 2 becomes the best response to
the EUs above strategy for a high-cost candidate as well.
Lemma 16 The strategy prole  = (EU ; CD(hc); CD(lc)) where
EU =
8>>><>>>:
reject "transitional measures for both chaptersdemands,
accept "transitional measures for Chapter 1 onlydemands,
reject "transitional measures for Chapter 2 onlydemands.
CD(hc) =
8<: demand transitional measures for both chapters,exit if any demand is rejected.
CD(lc) =
8<: adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety and demand transitional measures for Chapter 1,exit if any demand is rejected.
30
with the original probability distribution such that p 2 (0; 1); and the EUs belief structure as q < p
and r < p is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. In the equilibrium outcome, the Candidate
joins the EU if she is a low-cost type. She assumes the cost for the more costly chapter and gets
support from the EU to provisionally close the less costly one. Whereas a high-cost type candidate
leaves the table after her demand for transitional measures for both chapters gets rejected by the
EU. The Candidate receives u  2(lc) if she is a low-cost type and 0 if she is a high-cost type. The
EU receives [p(v   1(lc))]:
Proof. This equilibrium is similar to the preceding one. The proof is also very similar except that
this time, given the strategies of di¤erent candidate types, it must that q = 0 and t = p. Note that
information set 3 lies o¤ the equilibrium path so any belief will be consistent with the play of the
game including r < p. Thus the EUs strategy is consistent with her beliefs which are consistent
with the play of the game.
Note that this equilibrium is not valid when u   2(hc) > 0. Because then adopting Chapter
1 in its entirety and demanding transitional measures for Chapter 2 becomes the best response to
the EUs above strategy for a high-cost candidate as well.
Lemma 17 When u  2(hc) > 0; the strategy prole  = (EU ; CD(hc); CD(lc)) where
EU =
8>>><>>>:
reject "transitional measures for both chaptersdemands,
accept "transitional measures for Chapter 1 onlydemands,
reject "transitional measures for Chapter 2 onlydemands.
CD(hc) = CD(lc) =
8<: adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety and demand transitional measures for Chapter 1,exit if any demand is rejected.
with the original probability distribution such that p 2 (0; 1); and the EUs belief structure as q < p
and r < p is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. In the equilibrium outcome, the Candidate joins
the EU. She assumes the costs of adjustment for the more costly chapter and gets support from the
EU to provisionally close the less costly one. The Candidate receives u  2(lc) if she is a low-cost
type and u  2(hc) if she is a high-cost type. The EU receives [p(v   1(lc)) + (1  p)(v   1(hc)]:
Proof. Given that the EU rejects all demands about Chapter 2 and accepts those about Chapter
1, the best response of the Candidate is now to adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety and demand
transitional measures for Chapter 1 since u  2(lc) > 0 and u  2(hc) > 0. Note that the change
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in the assumption about the cost benet relations of the Candidate does not a¤ect the decision
rules of the EU. So, the EU still accepts all demands about Chapter 1 no matter who she thinks she
is dealing with. Similarly, the EU rejects at information set 1 if q < p and rejects at information set
3 if r < p: Given both type of candidates adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety and demand transitional
measures for Chapter 1, the EUs belief should be t = p at her information set 2. Since her decision
rule is to accept at that information set for all t 2 (0; 1), her strategy is consistent with her belief
which is consistent with the play of the game. Thus this is a sequential equilibrium.
5.1.2 The Chapter-by-Chapter Game, Easy Chapter Goes First
The equilibrium analysis of the chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the easy chapter consti-
tutes the proofs of Proposition 4,5,6, and 9. Let us again start with backward induction. Starting
from the bottom left in Figure 2; (i) since (u   2(hc)   c) < 0; a high cost candidate exits at
her decision node after her demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2 is rejected; (ii) since
(u (lc) 2c) < 0; a low-cost candidate exits if her demands for transitional measures for Chapter
1 and Chapter 2 are both rejected consecutively; (iii) since (u 2(lc) c) > 0; a low-cost candidate
backsdown if the EU accepts her demands for transitional measures in Chapter 1 but rejects them
for Chapter 2. On the top, since (u   (hc)   c) < 0 and (u   (lc)   c) < 0, both types exit if
her demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2 is rejected after she adopts Chapter 1 in its
entirety. Knowing these the EU then, (i) receives [q(v   2(lc)) + (1  q)(v   2(hc)] if accepts at
information set 1 and 0 if she rejects, which implies that the EU accepts at information set 1 if
q > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) ; (ii) receives [t(v   (lc)) + (1   t)(v   (hc))] if she accepts at information
set 3 and t(v   1(lc)) if she rejects, which implies that the EU rejects at information set 3 for all
t 2 [0; 1]; (iii) receives [z(v   2(lc)) + (1  z)(v   2(hc)] if she accepts at information set 4 and 0
if she rejects, which implies that the EU accepts at information set 4 if z > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) .
Knowing that the EU will reject if the third information set is reached, a low-cost candidate
agrees to adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety if her demand for Chapter 1 gets accepted since u 2(lc) >
u   2(lc)   c. A high-cost candidate however, since u   2(hc) < 0, even after her demand for
transitional measures for Chapter 1 gets accepted, insists on demanding transitional measures for
Chapter 2 although she knows that her demand will get rejected and that she will have to leave
the table. With this knowledge the EU then accepts demands about Chapter 1 regardless of her
belief as the expected payo¤ from accepting, which is r(v   1(lc)) is greater than the expected
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Nature CDlcLowcost [p]CDhc Highcost [1  p]

(u  2(lc);
v   1(lc))
Dt1
thenAd2

(0; 0)
Dt1
thenDt2
EU (1  q)
Ad1
thenDt2
 EU(q)
Ad1
thenDt2
info1

Ac
(u  1(hc);
v   2(hc))

Re
(0; 0)

(0; 0)
Re

Ac
(u  1(lc);
v   2(lc))
Figure 4: The chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the easy chapter after dominated actions
are eliminated under the assumption that u  2(hc) < 0:
payo¤ from rejecting, which is 0. So at the second information set the EU accepts for all r 2 [0; 1]:
With the EU accepting transitional measures for Chapter 1, adopting both chapters consecutively
becomes suboptimal for both types. Drawing the game tree again in light of the information we
have gathered through backward induction we get the reduced game depicted in Figure.4;
To simplify our proofs we will work with this reduced game to nd the equilibria of the original
version.
Now suppose the EU accepts at information set 1 which means q > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) ;
Given that the EU accepts at information set 1, and that u   1(hc) > 0 and u   1(lc) >
u   2(lc), adopting Chapter 1 in its entirety and demanding transitional measures for Chapter 2
is the best response for both types, which then implies q = p: If p > p then the EUs choice of
action is also justied. Thus, this is a sequential equilibrium when p > p.
Now suppose the EU rejects at information set 1 which means q < p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) ;
Given the EU rejects at information set 1, the best response of a low-cost type candidate is
to demand support for the easy chapter and then adopt the di¢ cult chapter in its entirety since
u 2(lc) > 0. But a high-cost type candidate does not have the luxury of adopting Chapter 2 in its
entirety since u  2(hc) < 0. She is left with no choice but to leave the table. There are two paths
for her to leave the table. She may adopt Chapter 1 in its entirety and then demand transitional
measures for Chapter 2. In which case, given the best response of a low-cost type candidate, the
EU will know for sure that she is facing a high-cost type, (q = 0), and thus her decision rule to
reject will be justied. Or the high-cost type Candidate may demand transitional measures for both
chapters consecutively, in which case, given the best response of a low-cost type candidate, the EU
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Figure 5: The chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the easy chapter after dominated actions
are eliminated under the assumption that u  2(hc) > 0.
will again know for sure that she is facing a high-cost type candidate and will reject her demand
for transitional measures in Chapter 2. Since information set 1 will be o¤ the equilibrium path, the
EUs belief q will be justied, so will be her decision rule. In sum, when p < p the chapter-by-
chapter game that starts with the easy chapter has two pure strategy sequential equilibria in both
of which the Candidate joins the EU only if she is a low-cost type. She gets support with the easy
chapter and adopts the di¢ cult chapter in its entirety. A high-cost candidate leaves the table.
Since we have covered all possible actions of the EU, we can conclude that the chapter-by-
chapter game that starts with the easy chapter has only three pure strategy sequential equilibria
in none of which the EU incurs all the costs.
We have obtained these equilibria under the assumption that u 2(hc) < 0. For u 2(hc) > 0,
a high-cost type candidates best response becomes to adopt Chapter 2 in its entirety if her demand
for transitional measures for Chapter 1 is accepted. This does not create any di¤erence in the EUs
decision rules in the any of the information sets. Again we can draw the reduced game as in Figure
5 ;
Let the EU accept at information set 1 which implies that q > p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) ;
We have the same equilibrium we have above for u   2(hc) < 0 and p > p and the proof is
the same.
Now, let the EU reject at information set 1 which implies that q < p = 2(hc) v2(hc) 2(lc) ;
Given that the EU rejects at information set 1 and that u  2(hc) > 0 and u  2(lc) > 0, the
best response for both types is to demand transitional measures for Chapter 1 and adopt Chapter
2 in its entirety which does not contradict the EUs belief at information set 1 that q < p as that
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information set lies o¤ the equilibrium path.
Since we have covered all possible actions of the EU, we can conclude that the chapter-by-
chapter game that starts with the easy chapter has two pure strategy sequential equilibria when
u  2(hc) < 0.
5.1.3 The Chapter-by-Chapter Game, Di¢ cult Chapter Goes First
The equilibrium analysis of the chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the di¢ cult chapter
constitutes the proofs of Proposition 7 and Proposition 10. Let us start with backward induction.
Starting from the bottom left in Figure 3; (i) since u   1(hc)   c > 0; a high cost candidate
backsdown if the EU accepts her demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2 and then rejects
a consecutive demand for transitional measures for Chapter 1; (ii) since (u   (hc)   2c) < 0, a
high-cost candidate exits if her demands for transitional measures for Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are
both rejected consecutively; (iii) since (u   (lc)   2c) < 0, a low-cost candidate exits if the EU
rejects her demands for transitional measures for Chapter 2 and Chapter 1 consecutively; (iv) since
u   1(lc)   c > 0, a low cost candidate backsdown if the EU accepts her demand for transitional
measures for Chapter 2 and then rejects a consecutive demand for Chapter 1. On the top (i)
since (u   (lc)   c) < 0 and (u   (hc)   c) < 0, both types exit if her demand for transitional
measures for Chapter 1 is rejected after she adopts Chapter 2 in its entirety. Knowing so the EU
then, (i) receives [q(v   1(lc)) + (1   q)(v   1(hc)] if she accepts at information set 1 and 0 if
she rejects, which implies that the EU accepts at information set 1 for all q 2 [0; 1]; (ii) receives
[t(v (lc))+(1 t)(v (hc))] if she accepts at information set 3 and [t(v 2(lc))+(1 t)(v 2(hc))]
if she rejects, which implies that the EU rejects at information set 3 for all t 2 [0; 1]; (iii) receives
[z(v 1(lc))+(1 z)(v 1(hc)] if she accepts at information set 4 and 0 if she rejects, which implies
that the EU accepts at information set 4 for all z 2 [0; 1]. Knowing that the EU will reject at
information set 3, and accept at information set 4; (i) the Candidate, adopts Chapter 1 in its entirety
if her demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2 gets accepted rst, regardless of her type
since u 1(hc) > u 1(hc) c and u 1(lc) > u 1(lc) c; (ii) since u 2(hc) c > u (hc) c
and u   2(lc)   c > u   (lc)   c, both types demand transitional measures for Chapter 1 after
backing down from a demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2; (iii) since 0 > u 2(hc)  c,
a high-cost candidate exits the game if her demand for transitional measures for Chapter 2 gets
rejected; (iv) since u   2(lc)   c > 0, a low-cost type candidate backsdown if her demand for
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transitional measures for Chapter 2 gets rejected. Anticipating these moves, then the EU rejects at
information set 2 for all r 2 [0; 1] since she receives [r(v  2(lc)) + (1  r)(v  2(hc)] by accepting
and v   1(lc) by rejecting. Knowing that the EU will reject demands at information set 2, a
low-cost type candidate adopts Chapter 2 in its entirety and demands transitional measures for
Chapter 1 since u 2(lc) > u 2(lc) c. Whereas, a high-cost candidate insists on asking support
with Chapter 2 as u  2(hc) < 0. She gets rejected and exits the game. Thus backward induction
gives us a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Let us now consider the case where u  2(hc) > 0:
Backward induction will lead us through the same paths up until the rst move of the Candidate.
But this time a high-cost candidate will choose to accept Chapter 2 in its entirety and then will
demand support with Chapter 1 just like a low-cost type one, since she gets a positive payo¤
now from becoming a member even after handling all the required reforms in the di¢ cult chapter.
Thus, with u  2(hc) > 0, the chapter-by-chapter game that starts with the di¢ cult chapter gives
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, under which the Candidate adopts Chapter 2 in its entirety
and demands support with Chapter 1 regardless of her type. The EU accepts this demand.
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